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MARKET AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF GMO INTRODUCTION IN SMALL 
EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
 
The advent of the “Gene Revolution” has sparked a significant research effort aiming at 
identifying the market and welfare effects of the introduction of genetically modified 
crops (GM) into the food system. Due to the producer orientation of the first generation 
of GM products, particular emphasis has been placed on the agronomic benefits of the 
new technology and the potential for a productivity boost in developing countries.   
The studies on the economic effects of agricultural biotechnology for the 
developing world have generally been based either on computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models or on partial equilibrium models, sometimes modified to incorporate 
peasant production through production surplus models. While the CGE models have 
provided several useful simulated aggregate welfare effects for different regions of the 
world, their focus has been on large countries with direct influence on the world prices of 
the GM crops under study (see Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky; Anderson and 
Jackson). Small countries are customarily incorporated in the “Rest of the World” 
(ROW), limiting the insights of this approach on the economic effects of GM crops on 
small open economies.   
Regarding the partial equilibrium approach, it has mainly focused on a country-
specific setting with the production sector being the only explicitly modeled sector of the 
economy (see Qaim; Qaim and Zilberman; Brooks and Barfoot; Wambugu and Kiome). 
Consumer behavior and the conduct of the life science sector are, generally, implicit and 
superficially treated in this literature. An exception is the work by Fulton and Giannakas 
that develops a model of heterogeneous consumers, producers and oligopolistic 
innovating firms to analyze the economic effects of the GM technology under different 
regulatory and labeling regimes in the context of a closed economy.   
The objective of this paper is to analyze the market and welfare effects of the 
introduction of GM products in small open developing economies that, prior to the 
adoption of GM crops, were net exporters of conventional, non-GM products. In 
analyzing the economic ramifications of GMO introduction in small exporting countries, 
our analysis follows Fulton and Giannakas and explicitly accounts for differences in   3
consumer attitudes towards GM products and producer agronomic characteristics as well 
as for the structure and conduct of the GM seed suppliers. Different scenarios concerning 
different labeling regimes in the small exporting country and the world market of the 
product are considered within this framework.  
The paper is structured as follows. The following two sections consider different 
scenarios under labeling and no labeling in the world market. Within each section, an 
array of different scenarios is analyzed, grouped according to the domestic labeling 
regime (labeling or no labeling). Within each group of scenarios, the base scenario with 
no domestic GM production or consumption is analyzed first and then scenarios with the 
GM product being imported or exported are analyzed. Only non-drastic innovation 
scenarios are analyzed. The equilibrium quantities and prices as well as the welfare of the 
groups involved are determined for each scenario. The article concludes with a discussion 
of the policy implications of the results. 
 
Section I: Labeling in the world market 
Four groups of economic agents are included in the model: seed suppliers, producers, 
retailers and consumers. Producers buy seed from seed suppliers, produce the food 
product and sell it to retailers, who distribute it to final consumers (either domestic 
consumers or importers from other countries). For simplicity of exposition fixed 
proportions between the seed, the agricultural product and the final consumer product 
will be assumed throughout the paper. Following Fulton and Giannakas, consumers are 
assumed to differ in their willigness to pay for different types of substitute products and 
farmers are assumed to differ in the returns they receive from the production of GM and 
conventional crops due to differences in the location and quality of land, education, 
experience, management skills, technology adopted etc. Unlike Fulton and Giannakas, 
the seed suppliers considered in this paper are not the innovating firms that have 
developed the GM technology but intermediaries that supply the domestic producers with 
GM seeds developed by life science companies elsewhere. Another difference with 
Fulton and Giannakas is that, by considering the effects of GMO introduction in an open 
economy, domestic equilibrium prices and quantities are directly influenced by world 
prices.    4
To analyze that influence, we determine first the prices that would clear the 
domestic market if the small country was a closed economy, and then compare those 
prices with the world prices of the product. If the domestic market clearing price is higher 
(lower) than the corresponding world price, then the small country will be an importer 
(exporter) of that product. 
The prices and quantities that equilibrate the markets for the farm input, the farm 
output, and the final consumer product are derived for each scenario considered in this 
paper. The welfare of each group is determined and compared to that under the base 
scenario of no GM production or consumption in the domestic market.  
Finally, in grounds of simplicity, whenever the country is a net importer of a 
product, it is assumed that consumers pay for all marketing costs of that product, while 
producers are assumed to do so if the country is a net exporter. 
 
S. I. 1. World labeling. No domestic labeling. No domestic GM production or 
consumption. (Base scenario 1) 
This section examines the case in which only the conventional product is produced and 
consumed in the domestic economy, and there is an excess supply of that product that is 
exported to the world market. It is assumed that the country is small, so it is a price taker 
in the world market of the traditional (non-GM) product. Besides, since in the world 
market the traditional product is differentiated from the GM product through labeling 
(which is assumed to include country of origin certification
1), and since there is no GM 
product consumption or production in the domestic market, there is no reason for the 
domestic economic agents to incur the costs of maintaining a local labeling regime. Just 
the fact that the product comes from this country serves as a certification that it is 
traditional, and so it enjoys the corresponding price premium for traditional products.   
The consumer problem is analyzed first, followed by the analysis of the producer 
problem and the GM seed supplier problem. After analyzing the optimizing behavior of 
the different economic agents, equilibrium conditions are imposed on the price relations, 
and the final price that would clear the internal market if the country was a closed 
                                                 
1 If the labeling regime in the world market did not include the country of origin certification, the price 
received by the domestic traditional product in the world market in the absence of domestic labeling would 
be that of the GM product.   5
economy is derived. As mentioned previously, this price must be lower than the world 
price of the traditional product for the domestic country to be an exporter. After 
incorporating this restriction, equilibrium prices and quantities are derived and the effect 
of GMO introduction of the welfare of each group and the aggregate welfare of the small 
open economy is determined. Findings are summarized at the end of the section. 
 
The Consumer Problem: 
Following Fulton and Giannakas, in the absence of the GM product consumers choose 
whether to consume a unit of the traditional product or a unit of a substitute product. 
Consumers spend a small fraction of their expenditures in these goods, they are 
differentiated by a characteristic c ( [0, ] cC ∈ ), and have the following utility function:  
tt UUp c µ =−−   if a unit of traditional product is consumed 
s s UU p =−    if a unit of a substitute product is consumed 
where  t U and  s U  are the per unit utilities associated with purchasing the traditional 
product and the substitute product, respectively. The corresponding prices are t p and  s p , 
where  s t p p > . The parameter U is a per unit base level of utility, while the parameter µ 
is a nonnegative utility discount factor that is constant across consumers. The 
characteristic c differs among consumers and reflects heterogeneous willingness to pay 
for the traditional product. Consumers are ordered according to increasing values of c 
(the lowest being c=0 and the highest c=C), i.e. according to decreasing willigness to pay 
for the traditional product. 
The demand for the traditional product is obtained by equating the per unit 
utilities and solving for the indifferent consumer, c*, to the left of whom all consumers 









All consumers to the right of c* will demand the substitute product.  
Aggregate consumer’s welfare is the summation of the area under the  t U curve and above  



















Figure 1. Determination of consumption with no GM. 
The Producer Problem 
As mentioned previously, producers are assumed to differ in the returns they receive from 
the production of the different crops. Let A∈[0, A] be the attribute that differentiates 




tt t p wA π β =−+    if a unit of traditional product is produced 
f
aaa p w π =−     if a unit of an alternative product is produced 
where 
f
t p and 
f
a p  indicate the prices at the farm level (net of all production costs except 
for seed and chemicals) of the traditional and the alternative crop, respectively. The 
parameters t w and a w  are the prices of the traditional and the alternative seed, respectively, 
including the corresponding chemical packages. The parameter β is a non-negative cost-
enhancement factor that is constant across producers. Producers are organized according   7
to increasing values of A, ranging from 0 to A. For simplicity, the returns to the 
production of the alternative crop are normalized to zero. 
In order to determine the domestic supply of traditional product, the two net 
return functions are equalized and the indifferent producer with characteristic A* is 
solved for. All producers to the left of the indiferent producer will produce the traditional 











Figure 2. Determination of production with no GM. 
 





















Suppliers of traditional seeds are assumed competitive, selling any quantity at a constant 
price t w . 
Price Equilibrium Conditions:   8
The price paid by final consumers differ from the farm price received by farmers for their 
product by an amount that reflects the internal marketing costs (IM). These costs include 
concepts like transportation, packaging, market power along the supply chain, etc. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that marketing costs for both the domestic and the export 
markets are the same. Hence, the price equilibrium condition is:  
(5) 
f
tt n g m ppI M =+   
where the subscript ngm indicates the marketing cost of the traditional product in the 
absence of GM product from the market. 
Using (1), (3) and (5) we can derive the final price of the traditional product that 
would clear the domestic market if the small country was a closed economy, as:  
(6) 






















Figure 3. Price that would equilibrate internal market if the economy was closed. 
External Market: 
Since the country is a small exporter to the world market of the conventional product by 
assumption, it faces an infinitely elastic external demand at the Free On Board (FOB) 
price of the product in the world market (
FOB
t p ).
2 The external demand is: 
(7) 
FOB
tt p p =  
                                                 
2 FOB indicates that a price does not inlcude insurance and freight of the product to its final destination.   9
For the country to be a net exporter of the conventional product, it must hold that 
closed FOB
tt p p ≤ . This implies that an excess supply of the traditional product exists in the 
domestic market (
SD
tt x x Exports =+ ), and the consumer price in the domestic market will 
be
FOB
t p . 
Market Outcome: 
Equating (7) and (5), and using that information to solve (3) and (1), we derive the price 
received by the farmers per unit of conventional product, the quantity consumed in the 
local market, the quantity produced, and the quantity exported, as: 
(8) 
* fF O B


















































Figure 4. Market outcome in the base scenario under world labeling. 
 
Welfare Analysis:   10
Aggregate welfare is given by the the summation of consumer and producer welfare 











=+ + Ω  
Consumer welfare is a decreasing function of 
FOB
t p , and the utility discount factor µ. 
Producer welfare is an increasing function of 
FOB
t p , and a decreasing function of the 
internal marketing costs, the costs of the seed and the chemical package, and the cost 
enhancement factor. An increase in 
FOB
t p  generates an increase in aggregate welfare, 
leaving producers better off and consumers worse off. 
Increases in the cost of the traditional seeds, or in the internal marketing costs 
reduces aggregate welfare by reducing producer welfare. Increases in the price of the 
substitute in consumption will induce more people to consume the traditional product, 
increasing the aggregate welfare generated by this sector of the economy. 
 
 
S. I. 2. World labeling. Domestic labeling. No domestic GM production. Domestic 
GM consumption (imports). 
Consider now the case in which the small country continues to export the traditional 
product, but it also imports GM product from the world market. The main difference with 
the previous model is that, in order for the small country to keep exporting the domestic 
production in the world market for traditional product, a domestic labeling system must 
be put in place that matches the criteria used by the labeling regime in the world market. 
The same steps as in the previous model are followed to derive the equilibrium prices, 
quantities and welfare under this scenario. 
The Consumer Problem: 
In this setting, consumers have one more choice than in the previous case, namely, 
consuming the GM product. As in Fulton and Giannakas, the utility function is: 
tt UUp c µ =−−   if a unit of conventional product is consumed, 
gm gm UU p c λ =− −    if a unit of GM product is consumed, 
s s UU p =−    if a unit of a substitute product is consumed,   11
where λ and µ are nonnegative utility discount factors that are constant across consumers. 
It is assumed that γ = λ - µ > 0,  denoting the consumers’ degree of aversion to GM 
products (Figure 5). The parameters pt, pgm and ps represent the final prices paid by 
domestic consumers of the traditional, the GM and the substitute product, respectively. 
Once again, the parameter U represents a per unit base level of utility that is constant 
across consumers. 
As specified in Fulton and Giannakas, this formulation of the utility function 
captures the notion of vertical product differentiation (Musa and Rosen), according to 
which if both the traditional and the GM products were offered at the same price, all 














Figure 5. Consumer decisions with GM, non-GM and substitute products. 
 
To derive the demands for the different products, the indifferent consumer between the 
GM and the non-GM product, and the indifferent consumer between the non-GM and the 
substitute product must be identified. In this context,  gm U = t U  determines cgm, the 








==    12
By equating Ut and Us, the indifferent consumer between the conventional and the 
substitute product is identified, cT. Substracting the quantity of GM product demanded 
from this value, we get the demand for the traditional product as: 
(14) 







== −  
Consumer welfare is the area under the upper envelope of the utility curves and is given by:  
(15) 
2 2 () ()
22




= ++ Ω  
The Producer Problem: 
Note that since no GM crop is produced domestically in this scenario, the producer 
problem is exactly the same as in the base scenario 1. 
Seed Suppliers: 
Suppliers of traditional seeds are assumed competitive, selling any quantity at a constant 
price t w . 
Price Equilibrium Conditions: 
Since in this scenario there is domestic labeling to differentiate the GM from the 
traditional product, there are two equilibrium conditions to account for the different 
internal marketing costs for each type of product. The final domestic prices of the 
traditional and GM products are, respectively,  
(16) 
f
tt t p pI M =+  
(17) 
M
gmg m g m p pI M =+  
where 
M
gm p  is the unit price of the imported GM product, and  t IM and  gm IM  are the 
marketing costs per unit of traditional and GM product, respectively. Note that due to the 
costs associated with the labeling and segregation of the two products, the marketing cost 
for the traditional product is higher than the marketing cost for the GM product, which is 
not smaller than the marketing cost of the traditional product in the base scenario: 
t IM > gmn g m IM IM ≥ .  
The price that would equilibrate the domestic market of the traditional product if 
there were no traditional exports is obtained by equating (13) and (14) and substituting 




s tt g mg m closed
t








Note that this is not the final price faced by consumers of the traditional product. It is 
only a benchmark price useful for comparative purposes only, that allows us to classify 
different scenarios. 
External Market: 
It is assumed that the world prices of the GM and the traditional product are fixed and the 
small country is a price taker in both markets. The price of the GM product is: 
(19) 
M FOB
gmg m pp =   
Furthermore, it is assumed that the external marketing costs of the GM product 
(insurance and freight) are zero
3. The world demand for the traditional product is: 
(20) 
FOB
tt p p = . 
For the country to be an exporter of traditional product, the following condition must be 
met:
closed FOB
tt p p ≤ . This implies that the unit profit made by the producers of the 
traditional product plus the difference between the final prices of the substitute and the 
GM product has to be greater than the difference between the final prices of the substitute 
and the traditional product: 
(21)  () ( ) ( )
FOB FOB FOB
tt t s g m g m s t pI M w p pI M p p µγ βµ βλ −− + − − > − . 
Market Outcome: 
The equilibrium prices and quantities are obtained by solving simultaneously the supply 
and demand relationships in the domestic and external markets. Introducing (17) into 











Using the information on (14), (16), (17) and (20), the equilibrium quantity consumed 
domestically of the traditional product is given by: 
                                                 
3 If external marketing costs of the GM product were positive, the domestic price that would clear the 
market of the GM product could fall in between the world price of the GM product and that price plus the 
external marketing costs, in which case the small country would behave as a closed economy in the market 




s tg m g m D
t






By imposing the corresponding price restrictions on the supply of the traditional product, 
















t x x > .  
Welfare Analysis: 
To assess the effect of different parameters on the welfare of consumers and producers, 
the equilibrium prices are substituted into the welfare functions (15) and (4): 
(25) 
2 2 () ()
22
FOB FOB FOB














Note that the final price of the GM product in the domestic market affects only consumer 
welfare (negatively). Hence, a decrease in the final price of the GM product due to a 
change in any of its two components (internal marketing costs and/or the FOB price in 
the world market) will increase aggregate welfare in the domestic economy. On the other 

























. Since the 
small country is an exporter of the traditional product, the change in aggregate welfare in 
the domestic economy due to an increase in 
FOB
t p  is positive. 
Comparing next the welfare of consumers and producers in this model to the relevant 
welfare measures in the base model, we can determine the impact of opening the 
economy to GM products that are labeled both in the domestic and the world market. The 
price of the alternative product and the world price of the traditional product are assumed 
constant, leaving Ω unchanged across models.    15
Consumer welfare increases because a new product is being offered at a lower price 
without altering the price of the established one (Figure 6). Consumers benefit from the 
presense of GM products by a value equal to the square of half of the GM imports 
weighted by twice the parameter of consumer aversion to the GM product. The greater 
the imports and the smaller the consumer aversion to the GM product, the greater the 
























Figure 6. Increase in consumer welfare from base scenario to S.I. 2 
 
Producers lose due to the costs associated with the segregation and labeling of the 
conventional product when the (inferior) GM product is in the market. The loss is 
proportional to the difference () 0 ngm t IM IM − ≤ , the factor of proportion being a 
weighted average of the fixed net returns per unit of traditional product with and without 
labeling. The closer the marketing margins, the smaller the loss. In the limit, when the 
marketing costs of the traditional product are the same across labeling regimes, the 
change in welfare is strictly positive. The change in producers welfare depends positively   16
on the price of the traditional seed and its chemical package: the higher this price, the 
smaller the size of the traditional productive sector, and the smaller the number of 
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Figure 7. Decrease in producer welfare from base scenario to S.I. 2 
 
Obviously, the effect of GMO introduction on aggregate welfare in the small open 
economy will depend on the difference between the increase in consumer welfare and the 
decrease in producer welfare: 
  0 W ∆≥  if the volume of GM imports is high, the consumer aversion to the GM 
product is low, the internal marketing cost of the traditional product under labeling is 
close to the corresponding marketing cost with no GM in the market and no labeling, 
and aggregate profits in the traditional sector are moderate before and after the 
introduction of the GM product (moderate size of the traditional productive sector).  
  0 W ∆< if the volume of GM imports is small, the consumer aversion to the GM 
product is high, the size of the traditional productive sector is substantial, and the   17
difference between the marketing costs of the traditional product under each scenario 
is significant. 
 
Result 1: Importing GM products and introducing labeling in the domestic market, with 
labeling in the world market increases consumer welfare and decreases producer welfare 
when compared to the base scenario. The aggregate welfare change depends positively 
on the volume of GM imports, and negatively on the degree of consumer aversion to the 
GM product, the spread between the internal marketing cost of the traditional product 
under the labeling regime with the GM product in the market and the internal marketing 
cost of the traditional product under no labeling without the GM product in the market, 
and the size of  the traditional productive sector both before and after the introduction of 
the GM product.  
 
S. I. 3. World labeling. Domestic labeling. Domestic GM production and GM 
consumption. 
Consider now the case where the small country produces both the GM and the 
conventional products, under a domestic labeling regime that matches the labeling regime 
in the world market. A new group of economic agents is introduced into the model: GM 
seed suppliers. As mentioned previously, GM seed suppliers in small countries are not 
assumed to have developed the GM technology. Instead, they act as intermediaries that 
supply to the domestic market the GM seed developed elsewhere. 
Depending on the characteristic of domestic consumers, producers and seed suppliers, 
and the world prices of both products, it is the case that the small country may either be 
an exporter or an importer of the GM product (to be consistent with the base model). As 
in all previous cases, the small country is assumed to be an exporter of the traditional 
product. 
For this subsection, the same framework will be used as in Fulton and Giannakas, but 
instead of solving for equilibrium prices (here, determined in the world market) the 
model will be solved for equilibrium quantities. To do so, we first derive the equilibrium 
in both markets assuming that the small country is closed to the world market of the GM 
product and it is an exporter of the traditional product. Depending on the difference 
between the domestic price of the GM product under the assumption of closed economy,   18
and the world price of the GM product, the small country will be a GM product exporter 
or a GM importer. After characterizing the market equilibrium in each case, a 
comparative static analysis will be conducted and the welfare changes relative to the base 
scenario will be assessed. 
The Consumer Problem: 
Under local labeling, the consumer problem is the same as in scenario S.I.2. 
The Producer Problem: 
In this scenario, each producer has to decide whether to produce the traditional, the GM 
or the alternative product. The net returns function becomes: 
()
f
tt t p wA π β =−+      if a unit of traditional product is produced; 
()
f
gm gm gm pw A π δ =− +   if a unit of GM product is produced; 
f





gm p  and 
f
a p  are the farm prices of the traditional, the GM and the alternative 
crop, respectively, net of all costs except for the seeds and chemical packages used. The 
parameters t w ,  gm w  and a w  are the prices of the traditional, the GM and the alternative 
seeds and chemical packages, respectively. The parameters β and δ are non-negative cost-
enhancement factors associated with the production of conventional and GM products, 
respectively, with  0 φ βδ =−>  reflecting the cost advantage of the GM over the 
traditional product. 
To determine the domestic supply of each product, the producers who are 
indifferent between growing traditional and GM crops and between GM crop and the 
alternative crop need to be identified. Then, using a similar procedure as the one used to 
solve the consumer problem in the scenario S.I.2, the supplies of traditional and GM 
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Figure 8. Producer decisions with GM, non-GM and alternative product. 
Producer welfare is determined by the area under the net return functions, and is given 
by: 
(31) 
22 ( ) [( ) ( )]
22
ff f






Under this setting, there are two types of seeds in the input market, the GM and the 
traditional seeds. Suppliers of traditional seeds are assumed competitive, selling any 
quantity at a constant price t w . Suppliers of GM seeds are assumed to have a contractual 
agreement  with the LSC, through which they have the exclusive right to sell in the small 
economy the GM seed developed by the LSC. The contract generates fixed costs for the 
GM seed suppliers in the domestic market and can represent a barrier to entry to the GM 
seed market. Hence, it may generate some market power for the GM suppliers.  
Assuming a derived demand for GM seed of the form w=a-bY, where  1
n
ii YY = =∑  
and n is the number of GM suppliers in the domestic economy, the  profit function of the 
ith GM seed supplier is: 
(32)  () ii i ab Y Y m c Y Π= − −    20
where mc is the marginal cost faced by the GM seed suppliers (marginal cost of GM 
seed, hereafter) . 
The equilibrium price of the GM seed is a weighted average of the marginal cost 










where θ is the conjectural variation elasticity. Finally, the aggregate output of the GM 












The conjectural variations elasticity allows an examination of various types of strategic 
interdependence among the GM seed suppliers. If, for example, there is only one GM 
seed supplier in the domestic market and significant barriers to entry exist, θ=1 can 
capture the firm’s behavior. If there are many GM suppliers of very similar seeds, then 
θ=1/N may capture their behavior in a homogeneous N-firm Cournot-Nash outcome. 
With Bertrand pricing, θ=0. However, the presence of fixed costs in the sector suggests 
that θ>0. 
To determine the explicit form of the derived demand for the GM seed, we 
express (28) as a function of the quantity of GM product supplied, which, under fixed 
proportions technology, is also the quantity of GM seed demanded in equilibrium. Thus, 
the demand for GM seed is: 
(35) 
()
   ;    where 
ff







= −= . 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (33) is the a parameter in the derived 
demand, and the slope on Y is the b parameter. The equilibrium price and quantity of the 



























                                                 
4 See Shy (p.102) for the derivation of this result.   21
Price Equilibrium Condition: 
Since in this scenario the small economy labels its conventional products, the equilibrium 
condition for the traditional product is given by (16). The equilibrium condition for the 
GM product will be determined in each of the scenarios adressed below. 
External Market: 
As mentioned previously, the country is a small traditional product exporter, with the 
retailers of the traditional product facing an infinitely elastic demand at 
FOB
t p . The 
domestic consumer price is also 
FOB
t p  while the price received by the producers of the 
traditional product is: 
(38) 
fF O B
tt t p pI M =−  
Using (13), (36), (37), we can derive the price that would equilibrate the domestic market 
for GM product if the economy was closed to the world market of GM product (but open 
to the world market of the traditional product) as: 
(39) 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
fc l o s e d F O B
gm t gm t
t
pp I M w
IM mc
δφ θ δγ δφ θ δγ
δφ θ βγ δφ θ βγ δφ θ βγ
δγ βγ







Depending on the relationship between the world price of the GM product and 
fc l o s e d
gm p , 
two  different scenarios emerge: 
i.  When 
fc l o s e d F O B
gmg m p p ≥ , the small country is a net importer of GM product.  
ii.  If 
f closed FOB
gmg m p p < , the small country is a net exporter of the GM product. 
 
S.I.3.i) 
fc l o s e d F O B
gmg m p p ≥ : Net importer of the GM product. 
The previous condition implies that the weighted average of the fixed net returns per unit 
of the traditional product and the difference between the final prices of the traditional and 
the GM product is greater than the value added (domestically) per unit of GM product: 
(40)  () ( ) ( 1 ) ( )
FOB FOB FOB FOB
t t t t gm gm gm pI M w ppI M pm c δγδ φ θ β γ − −+− − + ≥−  
Price Equilibrium Condition:   22
Under this scenario, the price equilibrium condition is the same as (17), because the small 
country is a net importer of the GM product: 
(41) 
M
gmg m g m p pI M =+  
External Market: 
If the cost of importing the GM product is less than the cost of producing it domestically, 
retailers will find it profitable to import it (i.e., (19) 
M FOB
gmg m p p = ). This implies that the 
final domestic price of the GM product is (see Figure 9): 
(42) 
FOB


















Figure 9. Demand, supply and imports of the GM product. 
Market Outcome: 
At the price  gm p , the domestic equilibrium quantity consumed of GM product is (using 











The equilibrium quantity of GM product consumed domestically increases with an 
increase in the price of the traditional product, a reduction in the final price of the GM 
product and/or a reduction in the consumer aversion to the GM product.  
Introducing the price equilibrium conditions into (14), the equilibrium quantity of 
traditional product consumed domestically is expressed as: 
(44) 
* () ( )
FOB FOB
st sg m g m D
t






while, doing the same with equations (34) and (35) gives the equilibrium price and 
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FOB FOB
gmt t t S
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The price of GM seeds increases with the cost of importing the GM product and with the 
marginal cost of GM seed, and falls with the net returns in the production of the 
traditional product. Note that under fixed proportions between seed and farm output, (46) 
is also the equilibrium quantity of GM product produced domestically.  
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GM imports are positive if (40) holds. Note that GM imports increase with the price of 
the traditional product (through an increase in the demand for the GM product and a 
decrease in the production of the GM product) and the marginal costs of the GM seed 
(through a reduction in the quantity of GM product domestically produced), and fall with 
the world prices of the GM product (through a decrease in the domestic demand for and 
an increase in the local production of GM product), the production and marketing costs of   24
the traditional product (through an increase in the supply of GM product), and the 
marketing cost of GM product (through a demand contraction by the increase in its final 
price). 
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The exports of traditional product increase with the world price of the product and the 
marginal cost of GM seeds, and fall with the production and marketing costs of the 
traditional product, the world price of the GM product, the price of the substitute product, 
and the internal marketing margin of the GM product. A higher world price of the 
traditional product will reduce local consumption of the traditional product and increase 
its local production, increasing the exportable volumes. An increase in the marginal cost 
of the GM seeds will reduce local GM production and some producers will shift to the 
production of the traditional product. An increase in the world price of the GM product 
will increase local consumption of the traditional product, plus some producers will shift 
their productions to GM products, negatively affecting the exportable volumes of the 
traditional product. An increase in the production and marketing costs of the traditional 
product reduces the net returns to traditional producers, who will shift their productions 
to the GM product. An increase in the price of the substitute in consumption increases the 
consumption of the traditional product, reducing its exportable volume. An increase in 
the marketing cost of the GM product increases consumption of traditional product, 
negatively impacting traditional exports. 
Welfare analysis: 
Introducing the information from the equilibrium conditions into the welfare function of 
each economic agent, we get welfare measures for consumers, producers, and GM seed 
suppliers as: 
(49) 
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∆= >  
The change in consumer welfare increases with the difference between the international 
prices and decreases with the internal marketing cost of the GM product and with the 
degree of aversion to it. 
In order to analyze the change in producer welfare, it is assumed that  tn g m t IMI M k =+ , 
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The sign of the change in producer welfare is undefined a priori, but if the marginal cost 
of labeling the traditional product tends to zero then the change in producer welfare is 
strictly positive. A sufficient condition for (53) to be positive is that the absolute value of 
the weighted difference between the value added (locally) per unit of GM product and the 
net profit per unit of traditional product in the base model be greater than the marginal 
cost of labeling the traditional product, weighted by the difference between the net profits 
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Consumers and GM seed suppliers are better off under this scenario than under the base 
scenario with no domestic GM production or consumption. The change in producer 
welfare is case-specific and it depends on the values of the parameters of the model. All 
producers of the traditional product in the base scenario will receive lower farm prices in 
the new scenario due to increased marketing costs stemming from the presence of GM 
products under a labeling regime. On the other hand, some producers will find it more 
profitable to grow the GM crop in the new scenario, increasing their aggregate profits. 
These two opposite effects can be seen graphically in Fig. 10, where the latter effect is 
represented by the area with horizontal lines to the right of A* and the former effect is 
represented by the area with vertical lines in between the net return functions for 
traditional crop producers under the two scenarios. The net change in producer welfare 
depends on the relative size of the two areas described above. 
 
Figure 10. Change in aggregate producer welfare from base scenario 1 to case S.I.3.i 
Aggregate welfare change will depend, obviously, on the actual values of the parameters 
of the model. If the welfare of the producers is increased, then the aggregate welfare 
change is positive; but if it not, then aggregate welfare change can either be positive or 
negative. 
Result 2: A scenario with domestic production and consumption of GM product under 
labeling in both the domestic and the world market, when the small country is an 
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exporter of the traditional product and an importer of the GM product, increases 
consumer welfare and GM seed supplier profits relative to a case with no domestic GM 
production or consumption (base scenario 1). The effect of domestic GM production and 
consumption on producer welfare is ambiguous and it depends on the world prices and 
preference parameters for the GM and the conventional products, the cost of segregating 
the GM and the  conventional product, the cost advantage of the GM over the 
conventional crop, and the market power of the GM seed suppliers. 
 
S.I.3. ii)  
fc l o s e d F O B
gmg m p p < : Net exporter of the GM product. 
The previous condition implies that the value added (locally) per unit of GM product is 
greater than the weighted average of the fixed net returns per unit of the traditional 
product and the difference between the final prices of the traditional and the GM 
products: 
(56)  () ( ) ( 1 ) ( )
FOB FOB FOB FOB
t t t t gm gm gm pI M w ppI M pm c δγδ φ θ β γ − −+− − + <−  
Price Equilibrium Condition: 
In this case, the price that would clear the domestic market of the GM product if the small 
economy was closed to the world market of GM products is lower than the world price of 
the GM product. Hence, the domestic country is an exporter of the GM product. Under the 
assumption that the domestic economy is a small exporter of the GM product, domestic 
retailers of the GM product will face an infinitely elastic demand at the world price. The 
structure of the model is exactly the same as in S.I.3.i, except for conditions (41) and (42). 






















Figure 11. Demand, supply and exports of the GM product. 
Market Outcome: 























The equilibrium price and quantity of the GM seed are: 
(60) 
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When compared to (46), (61) requires a smaller δ and/or a bigger β, implying a higher 
cost advantage of the GM seed over the traditional than in the previous model. 
The equilibrium supply of traditional product is: 
(62) 
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The quantity exported increases with the world price of the traditional product, the 
internal marketing costs of the GM product, and the marginal cost of the GM seed, and 
falls with the internal marketing costs and the price of the traditional seed, the world price 
of the GM product, and the domestic price of the substitute product. 
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which increase with the world price of the GM product, the marketing costs and the cost 
of the seed of the traditional product, and fall with the internal marketing costs of the GM 
product, the marginal costs of the GM seed, and the world price of the traditional product. 
Welfare Effects: 
Under this scenario, the welfare of consumers, producers, and GM seed suppliers are, 
respectivelly: 
(65) 
2 2 () ()
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Consumer welfare increases because a new product is being offered at a lower price 
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Producer profits can increase or decrease depending on the increase in marketing costs 
across scenarios, the marginal cost of GM seed, the cost advantage of the GM over the 
traditional crop, and the degree of market power by the GM seed suppliers. A sufficient 
condition for the change in producer welfare to be positive is: 









−− ≥ − − ⇒ ∆ ≥ ,  
which requires a substantial cost-enhancement factor associated with the traditional 
product (i.e., a high β; which ,in turn, implies a relatively small traditional productive 
sector in the first place), weak market power from the GM seed retailers, a moderate 
difference between the world prices of the traditional and the GM product, low marginal 
cost of GM seeds, and a small difference between marketing margins across models. 
(71)  0
RR WW ∆=>  
The suppliers of GM seeds make positive profits, increasing the welfare of those agents 
within the small country. Obviously, the effect of GMO introduction on agreegate 
welfare depends on the sign of ∆W





Result 3: A scenario with domestic production and consumption of GM products under 
labeling both in the domestic and the world market, when the small country is an exporter 
of the traditional and the GM products, benefits consumers and GM seed suppliers. The 
effect of GMO introduction on producer welfare depends on the increase in marketing 
costs, the world prices of both products, the marginal cost of the GM seed, the cost 
advantage of the GM over the traditional crop, the size of the traditional productive sector 
and the degree of market power by the GM seed suppliers. The overall effect of GMO   31
introduction on aggregate welfare will depend on the magnitude and direction of the 
welfare change for each group of agents. 
 
S. I. 4. World labeling. No domestic labeling. Domestic GM production and 
consumption. 
Consider now a scenario where both types of products are grown in the domestic 
economy, but no labeling regime is in effect domestically. Being unable to distinguish 
between the two types of products without the labels, consumers will pay only one price. 
 
Consumer Problem: 
Without domestic labeling, domestic consumers are not able to discriminate among 
traditional and GM products. Assuming a probability of ψ  that the product purchased is 
GM, the utility associated with the non-labeled product is: 
(1 ) ( ) nl gm t nl UU U U p c ψ ψψ γ µ =+ −= − − +  
and the utility associated with the consumption of a substitute product is: 
s s UU p =− 











Graphically, when compared to a utility function in the absence of GM product, 
Ungm, the utility associated with the non-labeled product, Unl, lies underneath everywhere 
Ungm to the right of c=0. The greater c is, the greater the distance between Ungm and Unl. 












Figure 11. determination of consumption under No-Labeling. 
Producer Problem: 
If the GM and the traditional products are not segregated, the farm product prices are 
identical, 
f
nl p . The net returns function is: 
()
nl f nl
tn l t p wA π β =− +    if a unit of traditional product is produced; 
()
nl f nl
gm nl gm p wA π δ =− +    if a unit of traditional product is produced; 
0
f
aaa pw π =−=      if a unit of an alternative product is produced; 
Note that only the non-drastic innovation scenario is analyzed, where 
nl nl
gmt ww > . 
 The supplies of the traditional and the GM product, obtained in the same fashion as in 
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The total supply of this mix of products in the small country is determined by:   33
(75) 
fn l



























Figure 12. Determination of production under No-Labeling 
Seed Suppliers: 
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Price Equilibrium Condition: 
The consumer price of the non-labeled product is given by the farm price and the 
marketing costs in the (non-segregated) supply channel of this product, i.e.,  
(78) 
f
nl nl nl p pI M =+  
External Market: 
After the introduction of the GM product under a no labeling regime, producers lose 
access to the world market for traditional products. Any domestic surplus can then be 
exported to the world market of the GM product at 
FOB
gm p .   34
Using the same methodology as in previous scenarios, the farm prices that would clear 
the domestic market if it was closed to international trade will be derived, and then 
compared to the international price of the GM product to determine if the country is a net 
exporter or importer of the non-labeled products. 
Solving simultaneously the equilbrium conditions in the domestic market, we determine 
the market clearing price of the non-labeled product as: 
(79) 
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Depending on the relationship between this price and the world price of the GM product, 
the following possibilities exist: 
i.  When 
f closed FOB
nl gm p p ≥ , the small country is a net importer of the GM 
product.  
ii.  If 
fc l o s e d F O B
nl gm p p < , the small country is a net exporter of the GM product. 
S. I. 4. i) 
fc l o s e d F O B
nl gm p p ≥ : Net importer of the GM product.  
Similar to S. I. 3. i), final product retailers will find it profitable to import the GM 
product (
M FOB
gmg m p p = ). The difference with that scenario is that both non-labeled GM and 
non-labeled traditional products will be sold at the final price: 
(80) 
FOB
nl gm nl p pI M =+. 
Market outcome: 
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and it depends positively on the price of the substitute product and negatively on the 
world price of the GM product, the marketing costs of the non-labeled product, the 
degree of consumer aversion to GM product, the proportion of GM product in the mix of 
non-labeled product, and the utility discount factor per unit of traditional product 
consumed.  
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and it depends positively on the world price of the GM product, and negatively on the 
cost of the traditional seed and the marginal cost of the GM seed.  
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and it depends positively on the international price of the GM product and on the price of 
traditional seed, and it depends negatively on the marginal cost of the GM product 
domestically produced. 
Comparing this scenario with the base scenario 1, the change in consumer welfare 
is given by:  
(88) 
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and it depends negatively on the world price of the GM product, the marketing cost of the 
non-labeled product, the degree of consumer aversion to GM product, the proportion of   36
GM product in the domestic supply, and the utility discount factor per unit of traditional 
product consumed. A sufficient condition for the change in consumer welfare to be 
positive is that the term in square brackets be positive, requiring that the weighted 
difference between the final prices of the traditional and the GM product has to be greater 
than the weighted difference between the final prices of the substitute and the traditional 
product. Hence, a significant reduction in the price of the non-labeled product after the 
introduction of the GM product in the market may increase consumer welfare even with a 
positive degree of consumer aversion to the GM product. This can easily be seen in 
Figures 13 a-c, where vertical lines represent increases in consumer welfare, while 

















Figure 13 a. Net change in consumer welfare from base scenario to SI4i depends on 
































Figure 13 c. Case: Decrease in consumer welfare from base scenario to SI4i. 
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and it depends positively on the world price of the GM product, and negatively on the 
cost of the traditional seed and the marginal cost of the GM seed. A sufficient condition 
for (89) to be positive is that the term in square brakets be positive, requiring substantial 
marketing costs in the base scenario, higher than the per unit net profit of the traditional 
product in the base scenario weighted by the market power in the , and the difference 
between those values to be higher than the difference between the world prices of the GM 
and the traditional product: 
(90)  () () 0
FOB
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IM p p W
θ
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The possible situations are depicted graphically in Figures 14 a-b, where profit increases 
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Figure 14 a. Case: Increase in producer welfare from base scenario to SI4i. 
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Figure 14 b. Case: Decrease in producer welfare from base scenario to SI4i. 
The change in GM seed supplier profits is: 
(91)  0
RR WW ∆=>  
 
Result 4: A scenario with domestic production, consumption and imports of GM product 
under labeling in the world market and no labeling in the domestic market, generates 
higher GM seed supplier welfare than a scenario with no domestic GM production or 
consumption (base scenario 1). The effect on producer and consumer welfare is 
ambiguous a priori, depending both on  the degree of aversion to the GM product and the 
international prices of the GM and the traditional product. Consumer welfare also 
depends on the probability of purchasing a GM product, the difference between the 
marketing costs in the two models,  and the price of the substitute product. On the other 
hand,  producer welfare also depends on the market power of the GM seed suppliers, the 
marginal costs of the GM seed suppliers and the cost advantage of the GM over the 
traditional product. 
 
S. I. 4. ii) 
fc l o s e d F O B
nl gm p p ≤ : Net exporter of the non-labeled product in the GM world 
market. 
External Market:   40
In this situation domestic retailers will find it profitable to export the non-labeled product 
at the world price of the GM product. The external market condition is: 
(92) 
FOB
nl gm p p = . 
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The total domestic supply of the non-labeled product is: 
(94) 
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which requires a significant cost advantage of the GM over the traditional product in 
production (β>>δ) to be positive. 
The equilibrium quantity of traditional product produced domestically is: 


























The non-drastic innovation condition implies that: 
(98)  () ( )
FOB nl nl
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and it depends negatively on the world price of the GM product, the degree of consumer 
aversion to GM product, the proportion of GM product in the domestic supply, and the 
utility discount factor per unit of traditional product consumed. 
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and it depends positively on the world price of the GM product, and negatively on the 
internal marketing costs of the non-labeled product, the cost of the traditional seed and 
the marginal cost of the GM seed. 
(102)  () { }
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Comparing this scenario with the base scenario 1, shows that the change in 
consumer welfare is given by:  
(103) 
2 2 () ()
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indicating that consumers are better off if  the welfare gain from a decrease in the final 
price is greater than the loss due to the consumption of uncertain quantities of the GM 
product: 
(104)  () ( ) ( ) ( )
2 FOB FOB FOB FOB FOB
tg m s g m s t s t p p pp pp pp µψ γ ⎡⎤ −− + − > − ⎣⎦ . 
When the consumers’ aversion to GM products and/or the proportion of GM product in 
the mix of non-labeled product are small, then consumer welfare change tends to be 
positive. 
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which can also be positive or negative, depending on the difference between the 
marketing costs in the two models, the world prices of the GM and the conventional 
product, the market power of GM seed suppliers, the marginal cost of the GM seed and 
the cost advantage of the GM over the traditional product. Finally, the change in GM 
seed supplier profits is given by 
(106)  0
RR WW ∆=> , 
and it is the only strictly positive term in the comparative analysis. 
 
Result 5: A scenario with domestic production and consumption of GM product under 
labeling in the world market and no labeling in the domestic market, generates higher 
GM seed supplier welfare than a scenario with no domestic GM production or 
consumption (base scenario 1). The effects on producer and consumer welfare are 
ambiguous, depending both on the international prices of the GM and the conventional 
products. Consumer welfare also depends on  the degree of aversion to the GM product, 
the probability of purchase of a GM product  and the price of the substitute product. 
Producer welfare also depends on the difference between the marketing costs in the two 
models, the market power of GM seed suppliers, the marginal costs of GM seed and the 
cost advantage of the GM over the traditional product. 
 
Section II: No Labeling in the world market 
In the second section of the paper, different scenarios under no labeling in the world 
market will be analyzed. In particular, a base scenario is delineated first with just the 
traditional product being produced domestically and exported, and then another setting is 
analyzed where GM is also domestically produced.  
 
S. II. 1. No world labeling. No domestic labeling. No domestic GM production or 
consumption. (Base scenario 2) 
In this scenario, only the traditional product is produced and consumed domestically. 
Since, by assumption, the small country is an exporter of the traditional product, it must 
be the case that it is profitable for retailers to sell the traditional product in the world 
market of the non-labeled product.   43
The Consumer Problem: 
Consumers have the following utility function: 
c p U U nl nl µ − − =
1   if a unit of the traditional product is consumed  
s s UU p =−    if a unit of a substitute product is consumed 









The Producer Problem: 
Producers’net return function, in this case, is: 
()
fn l
tn l t p wA π β =− +   if a unit of traditional product is produced 
0
f
aaa pw π =−=    if a unit of an alternative product is produced 
and the supply of traditional product is given by: 
(108) 
fn l







Price Equilibrium Condition: 
The domestic consumer price is: 
(109) 
f
nl nl nl p pI M =+  
External Market: 
Since the country is a small exporter to the world market, its domestic final price is: 
(110) 
FOB
nl nl p p =  
Market Outcome: 
The farm price for all producers is
fF O B
nl nl nl p pI M =−.  
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which depends positively on the disutility associated with the domestic consumption of 
the traditional product and on the size of the local productive sector, and negatively on 
the difference between  s p and
FOB
nl p . 
Welfare Effects: 
The aggregate welfare in the economy is the sum of consumer and producer welfare, 
where: 



















S. II. 2. No world labeling. No domestic labeling. Domestic GM production and 
consumption.  
The Consumer Problem: 
Similar to S.I.4, the consumer utility is: 
2 () nl nl UU p c ψγµ =− − +   if a unit of the non-labeled product is consumed 
s s UU p =−      if a unit of a substitute product is consumed 











The Producer Problem: 
The choices producers face are the same as those under S.I.4. The supply function of the 










which is positive when the cost of the GM seed is greater than the cost of the traditional 
seed. The supply of GM product is: 
(118) 
nl fn l
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which requires a substantial cost effectiveness of the GM over the traditional product to 
be positive. The total supply of the non-labeled product in the small country is: 
(119) 
fn l








As in Section I, seed suppliers face a linear derived demand for GM seed of the form 
w=a-bY. From (118), the actual derived demand for GM seed is: 
(120) 
fn l









Price equilibrium condition: 
The domestic consumer price is: 
(121) 
f
nl nl nl p pI M =+  
To determine if the country is a net exporter or importer of the non-labeled products, the 
price that would clear the domestic market if the small country was a closed economy 
needs to be calculated. This market clearing price is, as in (79): 
(122) 
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As introducing the GM product can only increase the supply of the non-labeled product, 
the preceding price must fall (due to an increase in ψ), and the country continues to be a 
net exporter. Hence, 
fF O B
nl nl p p > , is not a feasible scenario. 
Since the country is a net exporter,  0
Sn l
gm


















. On the other hand,  1 ψ ≤  requires
nl nl
gmt ww ≥ , which is always true under a 
non-drastic innovation. 
Market Outcome: 
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(124) 
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The equilibrium quantity of total domestic supply is: 



































Consumer welfare, producer welfare and GM seed suppliers’ profits are, respectively: 
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A comparison with S.II.1, reveals that the introduction of GM products results in a 
decrease in consumer welfare, an increase in producer welfare, and an increase in GM 
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The aggregate welfare effect will depend on the magnitude of the increase in producers 































Figure 15 a. Increase in producers welfare from S.II.1 to S.II.2 
 
Result 6: The introduction of GM products in a small open economy under no labeling 
either in the world or in the domestic market, benefits producers and GM seed suppliers 
and harms consumers.    48
 
Result 7: A scenario where the farm price increases after the introduction of the GM 
production is not feasible if the starting situation was one with domestic production and 




This paper analyzed the economic implications of GMO introduction in small exporting 
countries. The benchmark for the analysis was a setup with the domestic economy 
producing traditional products and exporting its excess supply to the world market. 
Various scenarios were considered in the analysis of the market and welfare effects of the 
introduction of a GM product, the welfare measures under each scenario were compared 
to those under the base scenario, and winners and losers, when possible, were identified. 
The market and welfare effects of the introduction of GM crops in small exporting 
economies were shown to be case-specific and dependent on the labeling regimes in the 
world market, the labeling regime in the domestic market, the segregation costs and the 
marketing margins under the different labeling scenarios, the domestic consumer 
attitudes towards GM products, the premium enjoyed by the non-GM crops, the relative 
cost effectiveness of GM crops under the local production conditions, and the market 
power of the GM seed suppliers.  
One repeated pattern along the lines of those results was that GM seed suppliers were the 
only group that always gained from the introduction of the GM product in the small 
country. Producers and consumers, on the other hand, were either benefited or harmed by 
the introduction of the GM product depending on the particular characteristics of the 
situation under analysis.  
An implication of these results is that a positive welfare effect of the introduction of GM 
products to small open economies should not be taken for granted. While yield increases 
and cost reductions associated with the GM technology are certainly important, their 
presence does not guarantee a positive effect on the welfare of all groups involved and/or 
on aggregate domestic welfare. Care must be exercised when assessing the impact of the 
introduction of GM products in small countries that have been traditional exporters of 
conventional products.   49
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